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Raze the Debt Ceiling: A Test Case for
State-Sovereign and Institutional
Bondholder Litigation to Void the Debt
Limit Statute
Victor Williams*
Abstract
In March 2015, the debt ceiling was hit again and sovereign
default loomed. Refusing to timely raise the debt ceiling,
congressional ideologues have four times pushed our nation to the
brink of a catastrophic debt default in as many years. Our
struggling economy is again threatened, financial institutions are
again spending millions planning for default, and vulnerable
citizens are once again worrying about their benefit payments.
Enough is enough.
This Essay argues that nationwide bondholder litigation can
void the unconstitutional debt ceiling, and it presents the first
litigation in that effort. (Williams v. Lew, No. 15-1565, U.S. Court
of Appeals - D.C. Circuit). The Constitution guarantees not only
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that public debt will remain valid, but also that the integrity of
those obligations will never be so much as questioned by our
nation’s government. The debt limit statute, facially and
as-applied, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Public Debt
Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Bondholders have standing to challenge the unconstitutional
statute as they suffer economic and noneconomic injuries resulting
from the degradation of their investments’ uniquely low-risk
profile and monetary value. These injuries manifest as both
current harm and certainly-impending future harm.
In the NAACP and ACLU’s tradition of “test cases,” the
author’s litigation is prosecuted with modest-success expectations,
but with strong determination to prompt future litigation by
others. The Justice Department has already exposed a defense
strategy based on combining Tea Party default-denial delusion
with Clapper v. Amnesty International standing hurdles.
The Essay pleas for state sovereigns and institutional
bondholders (with alternative standing allegations) to initiate
additional litigation. Public interest law firms, such as the
National Chamber Litigation Center and the Constitutional
Accountability Center, are challenged to lend support. As bond
buying has been since the Republic’s founding, this litigation
effort is a necessary act of economic patriotism.
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I. Introduction
In March 2015, the nation again hit the debt ceiling.1 The
U.S. Department of the Treasury began statutory enforcement
with “extraordinary measures” to forestall the effects of a
sovereign default.2 In August 2015, Treasury acknowledged
specific current harm resulting from the ongoing debt ceiling
deadlock. Treasury is being forced to reduce its “cash balance” (an
emergency fund) below the “minimum prudent level” needed to

1. See Demetri Sevastopulo, Lew Warns Congress Over US Debt Ceiling,
FIN. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0d818286-c9bd-11e4a2d9-00144feab7de.html#axzz3bkyIMUfm (last visited June 22, 2015)
(explaining how the debt limit was reached in March 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2012) (providing the public
debt limit).
2. See Peter Schroeder, Debt Limit Deadline Now Seen at End of 2015,
THE HILL (May 18, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/242404-debt-limitdeadline-now-seen-at-end-of-2015 (last visited June 22, 2015) (“In March, the
federal government was again subjected to an $18.1 trillion borrowing cap,
forcing the Treasury Department to begin employing its set of ‘extraordinary
measures’ to free up room under that ceiling.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Federal Debt and the Statutory Limit, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE
(Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.cbo.gov/publication/49961 (last visited June 22, 2015)
(explaining Treasury actions to “continue raising cash”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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address “emerging threats such as potential cyber attacks.”3
Treasury also warned of imminent market distortions resulting
from its forced reduction in the supply of short-term securities.4
Congressional ideologues have pushed our nation to the
brink of a catastrophic debt default four times in as many years
by refusing to timely raise the debt ceiling.5 Former Treasury
Secretary Tim Geithner describes their obstruction: “Many of
them truly seemed to believe that default could cleanse the sins
of the US economy, which was insane.” Geithner warns that a
debt-ceiling-caused default will be “economic Armageddon.”6
Extreme debt-ceiling ideologues strongly object to their own
party’s leadership compromising on, or using procedural
maneuvers for, debt limit suspensions or rises: “If reconciliation
is used to try and raise the debt ceiling, there may well be blood
on the floor of the House chamber.”7 These ideologues are unfazed
by warnings of a default’s macroeconomic harm8 or by the angst
3. See Jason Lange, U.S. Treasury Warns of Debt Cap Impact on Markets,
Cyber
Readiness,
REUTERS
(Aug.
5,
2015,
1:29
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/05/usa-debt-idUSL1N10G16320150805
(quoting Acting Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets, Seth Carpenter).
4. Id.; Kasia Klimasinska & Susanne Walker Barton, Treasury Warns
Debt Ceiling Deadlock Could Squeeze Bill Market, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 5, 2015,
12:03 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-05/treasury-warnsdebt-ceiling-deadlock-could-squeeze-bill-market?cmpid=yhoo.
5. See Danny Vinik, McConnell to Democrats: Get Ready for Another Debt
Ceiling
Fight!,
NEW
REPUBLIC
(May
1,
2015),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/121691/mitch-mcconnell-says-republicanswill-fight-debt-ceiling-year (last visited June 22, 2015) (discussing some of the
history of Congress and the national debt ceiling) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
6. TIM GEITHNER, STRESS TEST 465 (2014).
7. Nick Timiraous & Kristina Peterson, Debt Limit Drama Returns to
Political Stage: Negotiations Complicated by Sharp Divisions Among
Republicans in Congress and Coming Budget Talks, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/debt-limit-drama-returns-to-political-stage1426270672 (last visited June 23, 2015) (quoting Rep. Mike Mulvaney) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. See, e.g., Matthew O’Brien, Not Raising the Debt Ceiling: A Crisis, if
We’re Lucky, a Historic Calamity if We’re Not, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 29, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/09/not-raising-the-debtceiling-a-crisis-if-were-lucky-a-historic-calamity-if-were-not/280057/ (last visited
June 23, 2015) (predicting the negative, large-scale results of a default) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jay Fitzgerald, Debt Ceiling
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of individual Americans whose very survival is dependent on
timely receipt of government benefits (payments for Social
Security, veterans, disability, civil retirement, Medicare,
Medicaid, etc.).9 Representatives and senators reject reasoned,
expert counsel that the debt limit statute actually causes
congressional overspending.10
These GOP and Tea Party lawmakers, some of whom are also
2016 presidential candidates, continue to deny that a harmful
default will result from a debt ceiling breach.11 For example,
Maneuvering Threatens Economy, Analysts Say, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 13, 2013),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/10/12/debt-ceiling-maneuveringthreatens-economy-analysts-say/EtLEuIbzsP2bIZhTFWQq9I/story.html#\ (last
visited June 23, 2015) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
9. See, e.g., Sheryl Nance-Nash, Why Seniors Are Mad as Hell, DAILY FIN.
(July 13, 2013), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/07/13/social-security-checksdebt-ceiling/ (last visited June 23, 2015) (discussing the effects of not raising the
debt ceiling on those awaiting government support) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Jason Sadler, Boehner Demands Medicare, Social
Security and Medicaid Cuts To Raise Debt Limit, NAT’L MEMO (Aug. 27, 2011),
http://www.nationalmemo.com/boehner-demands-medicare-social-security-andmedicaid-cuts-to-raise-debt-limit (last visited June 23, 2015) (same) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Dylan Scott, Could the GOP Turn Social
Security Into a Perennial “Crisis” Like the Debt Limit?, TALKING POINTS MEMO
(Jan. 23, 2015), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/gop-congress-social-securitycliff-debt-ceiling (last visited June 23, 2015) (same) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Barbara Starr, Veterans Groups Summoned to White
House
on
Debt
Ceiling
Impact,
CNN
(July
26,
2011),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/07/26/debt.veterans/index.html (last visited
June 23, 2015) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. See Gary S. Becker & Edward P. Lazear, How ‘Debt Ceilings’ Increase
Debt,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Oct.
23,
2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303448104579149503424494292
(last visited June 23, 2015) (explaining how some think the debt limit statute
does not encourage overspending) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
11. See Reena Flores & Ali Tejani, The 2016 Field and the Debt Ceiling,
CBS NEWS (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/2016-and-the-debtceiling/ (last visited June 23, 2015) (noting the views of prominent GOP leaders
on the effect of a debt ceiling breach) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Ginger Gibson, Shutdowns, Debt Ceilings Loom: Congress Must Find
Negotiators,
INT’L
BUS.
TIMES
(Feb.
26,
2015),
http://www.ibtimes.com/shutdowns-debt-ceilings-loom-congress-must-findnegotiators-1828646 (last visited June 23, 2015) (same) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Rachel Bade, Default Deniers Scoff at DebtCeiling
Apocalypse,
POLITICO
(Jan.
16,
2013),

RAZE THE DEBT CEILING

101

Senator Rand Paul states with surprising naïveté: “If you don’t
raise your debt ceiling, all you’re saying is, ‘We’re going to be
balancing our budget.’”12 Paul states there is no reason to raise
the debt ceiling;13 he also made a Facebook pledge not to raise the
debt ceiling until a balanced-budget constitutional amendment is
enacted.14 When Republicans pledge not to “default on the debt,”
it is not a promise to timely raise the debt ceiling. Even
Republican leaders, such as Orrin Hatch, Chair of the Senate
Finance Committee, deny that a failure to raise the debt limit
would result in a Treasury debt default: “I think the
administration could work on who gets paid and who doesn’t in a
way that would pull us through.”15
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/default-deniers-pooh-pooh-debt-ceilingapocalypse-86253.html (last visited June 23, 2015) (same) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. Jonathan Weisman, Many in GOP Offer Theory: Default Wouldn’t Be
That
Bad,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
8,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/09/us/politics/many-in-gop-offer-theory-defaultwouldnt-be-that-bad.html?hp&_r=2& (last visited June 23, 2015) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. See Jonathan Easley, Paul: There’s No Reason to Raise the Debt Ceiling,
THE HILL (Oct. 2, 2013), http://thehill.com/video/senate/326265-paul-theres-noreason-to-raise-the-debt-ceiling (last visited June 23, 2015) (expressing Rand
Paul’s views on raising the debt ceiling) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
14. See
Rand
Paul,
FACEBOOK
(Jan.
4,
2013)
https://www.facebook.com/RandPaul/posts/324885054287210 (last visited June
23, 2015) (“I will not vote to raise the debt ceiling . . . .”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Rand Paul and other default deniers in the
2016 presidential primary race would presumably refuse to sign legislation
allowing a debt limit rise or suspension if elected President. GOP presidential
long-shot Senator Lindsey Graham has attempted to make an issue of his
primary opponents’ irresponsible, irrational debt limit positions. See Zeke J.
Miller, Lindsey Graham Challenges Republican Rivals on Debt Ceiling, TIME
(June 12, 2015), http://time.com/3919067/lindsey-graham-debt-ceiling/ (last
visited June 23, 2015) (noting Graham “challenging his opponents to take a
stance on raising the federal debt limit”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
15. David Weigel, Republican Senator: We Can Crash Into Debt Limit
“Because the Only People Buying Our Bonds Are the Federal Reserve,” SLATE
(Oct.
7,
2013),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2013/10/07/republican_senator_we_can_crash
_into_debt_limit_because_the_only_people.html (last visited June 23, 2015) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Congressional default-denial passions were inflamed in 2014
when the Treasury first acknowledged “technological” capability
to “make [bond] principal and interest payments while Treasury
was not making other kinds of daily payments.”16 A basic tenet of
default denial is that prioritization of bond payments, above any
of the other eighty million monthly payments made by Treasury,
would preclude default harm.17 Treasury’s technical capacity for
bond prioritization over its other required payments does not
eliminate the legal prohibitions against,18 or mitigate the
16. Tim Reid, Treasury Says Debt Payments Could Be Prioritized in
Default
Scenario,
CHI.
TRIB.
(May
9,
2014),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-05-09/news/sns-rt-us-usa-treasury-debt20140509_1_debt-payments-debt-limit-bond-payments (last visited June 23,
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
17. See Aaron Blake, Majority of GOP Not Worried About Debt Ceiling
Lapse, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postpolitics/wp/2013/10/15/majority-of-gop-not-worried-about-debt-ceiling-lapse/ (last
visited June 23, 2015) (explaining how some leaders are “default deniers”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Brian Faler, Debt-Limit Deniers
Scoff at Geithner’s Warnings of Default, BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-05-02/debt-limit-deniers-saygeithner-tries-to-stampede-republicans-on-debt-vote (last visited June 23, 2015)
(same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). GOP congressmen
have repeatedly failed to pass legislation requiring bond payment prioritization.
See generally John Avlon, Why We Need the Full Faith and Credit Act, DAILY
BEAST (May 9, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/05/09/why-weneed-the-full-faith-and-credit-act.html (last visited June 23, 2015) (explaining
the lack of prioritization on requiring bond payment) (on file with Washington
and Lee Law Review).
18. Treasury pays its bills as they come due using a classic “First In, First
Out” (FIFO) procedure with an implicit pari passu intent. See generally Natalie
A. Turchi, Note, Restructuring a Sovereign Bond Pari Passu Work-Around: Can
Holdout Creditors Ever Have Equal Treatment?, 83 FORDHAM. L. REV. 2171
(2015) (discussing the Treasury bill payment process). See also Binyamin
Applebaum, Treasury to Weigh Which Bills to Pay, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/28/business/economy/treasury-to-weigh-whichbills-to-pay.html?_r=0 (last visited June 23, 2015) (discussing how the Treasury
Department prioritizes bills) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Separately problematic, Treasury’s Financial Management Service is only
responsible for payment of approximately eighty-five percent of government
disbursements. The Department of Defense and certain independent agencies
independently disburse fifteen percent of government payments. See Fact Sheet:
Payment
Management,
FIN.
MGMT.
SERV.
(Mar.
14,
2014),
https://www.fms.treas.gov/news/factsheets/pmt_mgmt.html (last visited June
23, 2015) (explaining the Department of Treasury’s payment process) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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systemic economic damage that would result from, such payment
prejudice.19 Yet, the congressional default delusion has only
worsened. In May 2015, a former House Republican staffer
publically revealed that the Federal Reserve’s Open Market
Committee had plans to intervene in the event of a debt-limit
default.20 The House Financial Services Committee used the
revelation as justification to formally subpoena the Treasury and
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, demanding any
contingency plans for a debt-limit-caused default.21
During Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew’s June 2015 testimony
before the House Financial Services Committee, Republican
members referenced Lew’s answers to the committee as
“disdainful.” Lew again attempted to rationally explain the limits
of bond payment prioritization: “[W]e do have the technical
capacity but it would be a terrible thing to do because you would
be defaulting.” In combative remarks, Representative Mick
Mulvaney alleged that Lew and the Obama Administration were
purposely promoting marketplace “chaos” by refusing to assure
that bond payment prioritization would be implemented in a
default. Mulvaney stated to Lew: “[A]nswers regarding payments
19. See S. Rep. No. 99-144, at 5 (1985) (describing the consequences of
delayed approval); Prompt Payment Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3901 et seq.; see also Ian
Katz, Geithner Says Delaying Debt Payments ‘Deeply Irresponsible’, BLOOMBERG
(June 29, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-06-29/geithnersays-prioritizing-debt-payments-deeply-irresponsible- (last visited June 23,
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Neal Wollin, Deputy
Secretary of the Treasury, Proposals to “Prioritize” Payments on U.S. Not
Workable; Would Not Prevent Default, DEP’T OF TREASURY (Jan. 21, 2011),
http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Proposals-to-Prioritize-Paymentson-US-Debt-Not-Workable-Would-Not-Prevent-Default.aspx (last visited June
23, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
20. Fed Said to Have Debt Ceiling Plan Involving Market Interventions,
REUTERS (May 11, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/11/usa-debtidUSL1N0Y21UL20150511 (last visited June 23, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. David Harrison, Head of House Panel Sends Subpoenas to N.Y. Fed and
Treasury, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/head-ofhouse-panel-sends-subpoenas-to-n-y-fed-and-treasury-1431455910 (last visited
June 23, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For a recent
article suggesting what the role of the Federal Reserve might be in a default, see
Charles Tiefer, Confronting Chaos: The Fiscal Constitution Faces Government
Shutdowns and (Almost) Debt Defaults, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 511, 544–51 (2014).
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are not being given to us because you want the chaos, because
you think it’s preferable to you and your administration, this
administration, to have the chaos, that it will help you achieve
politically what you want to achieve.”22
Less than a month later, however, Lew found strong support
as Congress’ own Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued
an alarming Report analyzing the market disruptions caused by
the 2013 default crisis. As one of the three suggested reform
alternatives, the nonpartisan congressional investigative agency
proposed that the debt ceiling be eliminated.23 The GAO reported
that the 2013 marketplace experienced “both a dramatic increase
in rates and a decline in liquidity in the secondary market where
securities are traded among investors.”24 Noting that the research
underlying the Report had been subjected to the econometric
review of five independent economists,25 the GAO described:
During recent debt limit impasses, investors reported
systematically taking actions to avoid certain Treasury
securities that matured around the dates when Treasury
projected it would exhaust its extraordinary measures (at-risk
Treasury securities), including selling them, not purchasing
them, and not using or accepting them as collateral in
financial transactions. These actions caused interest rates on
at-risk Treasury securities to increase. They also caused a
decline in liquidity for at-risk Treasury securities and
ultimately added to Treasury’s borrowing costs.26
22. Video of Secretary Jack Lew’s June 17, 2015 Testimony Before the
House Financial Services Committee (C-SPAN television broadcast) [Quoted
exchange with Rep. Mike Mulvaney at 02:17:39], http://www.cspan.org/video/?326614-1/secretary-jack-lew-testimony-financial-stability-report.
See also US’s Lew Spars With Republican Foes of Dodd-Frank, MARKET NEWS
INT’L (June 17, 2015), https://www.marketnews.com/content/update-uss-lewspars-republican-foes-dodd-frank (last visited June 23, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
23. Nick Timiraos, Should Congress Abolish the Federal Debt Limit?, WALL
ST. J. (July 10, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/07/10/shouldcongress-abolish-the-federal-debt-limit/ (last visited July 19, 2015) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
24. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 15-486, DEBT LIMIT: MARKET
RESPONSE TO RECENT IMPASSES UNDERSCORES NEED TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES (2015) [hereinafter GAO Report].
25. Id. at 4, 57.
26. Id. at 12.
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In perhaps its most disturbing nontechnical revelation, the
GAO Report used the term “at-risk Treasury securities”
throughout the report. In the period of time exactly correlated to
the political rise of the Tea Party, the risk profile of United States
Treasury investments has been degraded from “risk-free” to
“low-risk” to “at-risk.”
According to Congress’s auditing agency, the amount of
“at-risk” Treasury securities totaled “more than $3 trillion”
outstanding, which was “25 percent of the debt held by the public
at the time.” 27 A full one-quarter of all the Treasury debt of the
United States of America was determined by the GAO to have
been “at risk” of default.
Scared investors, large and small, turned to commercial
paper and to relatively “safe” securities issued by such paragons
of financial stability as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.28 As the
Securities and Exchange Commission restricts the ability of
money market funds to hold defaulted corporate or sovereign debt
(whether Greek, Argentine, or American), money market
managers were at the front of the 2013 queue dumping
short-term U.S. Treasuries. 29
The marketplace has long had a rational view of debt default.
Leading bank analyst Richard Bove alerted clients in 2013 that,
in addition to other severe harms, a default would wipe out the
Federal Reserve’s working equity and undermine the dollar’s
value: “The devastation to the United States would be so severe
that it would take decades to recover from the Depression caused
by a default and the attendant dumping of trillions of dollars of
27. Id. at 14.
28. See id.
Market participants told us that as substitutes for the at-risk
Treasury securities, investors used bank deposits, agency discount
notes—short-term securities issued by government sponsored
enterprises (GSE) such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal
Home Loan Banks—and commercial paper—short-term securities
issued by corporations to raise cash needed for current transactions.
29. See id. at 15 (“Fund managers and other market participants said that
Securities and Exchange Commission rules also contributed to their decision to
avoid certain Treasury securities. These rules limit the ability of money market
funds to hold defaulted securities without the approval of a fund’s board of
directors.” (citing 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(f) (2010))).
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U.S. Treasury securities on the global financial markets.”30 In
October 2013, the ratings firm Fitch placed the United States’
credit on a “Ratings Watch Negative.”31 Investment houses,
institutions, and individuals sold billions of dollars in short-term
Treasury debt.32 The “TED spread” inverted, evidencing for the
first time that commercial interbank loans were considered safer
than Treasuries.33 Large banks and investment houses spent
millions of dollars to implement default contingency plans,
including developing plans to partially underwrite customers’
government benefits. Financial institutions worked closely with
the U.S. Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
in attempts to develop protocols to mitigate systemic disruption
to markets in a default. J.P. Morgan alone spent more than 100
million dollars in such default planning. “With each crisis, the
once-unthinkable scenario of a U.S. default becomes a little more
real” to the marketplace.34
30. Mike Obel, Treasury Default Could Crash US, Global Economy: Bank
Analyst Richard Bove, Leading to a Depression Lasting Decades, INT’L BUS.
TIMES (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/treasury-default-could-crash-usglobal-economy-bank-analyst-richard-bove-leading-depression-lasting
(last
visited June 23, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
31. Fitch Places United States’ ‘AAA’ on Rating Watch Negative, REUTERS
(Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/15/fitch-places-unitedstates-aaa-on-rating-idUSFit67327220131015 (last visited June 23, 2015) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). After the 2011 debt default
crisis, S&P downgraded U.S. Debt for the first time in history. See Binyamin
Applebaum & Eric Dash, S&P Downgrades Debt Rating of U.S. for the First
Time, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2011), www.nytimes.com/2011/08/06/business/us-debtdowngraded-by-sp.html (last visited June 23, 2015) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
32. See Min Zeng, Uneasy Investors Sell Billions in Treasurys, WALL ST. J.
(Oct.
14,
2013),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230433090457913594379965548
8 (last visited June 23, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
see also D. ANDREW AUSTIN & MINDY R. LEVIT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31967,
THE DEBT LIMIT: HISTORY AND RECENT INCREASES 8 (2013) (explaining how the
debt has been managed in the past).
33. See Katie Holliday, US Treasuries? No Thanks, I’ll Take Bank Debt,
CNBC (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101115800 (last visited June 23,
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
34. David Henry & Lauren Tara LaCapra, Insight: As U.S. Default
Threatened, Banks Took Extraordinary Steps, REUTERS (Nov. 19, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/19/us-usa-fiscal-banks-warroomsinsight-idUSBRE9AI05P20131119 (last visited June 24, 2015) (on file with the
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Over the objection of its default deniers, and at the twelfth
hour, in October 2013, Congress temporarily suspended the debt
ceiling with the quite accurately entitled “The Default Prevention
Act.”35 Agreeing to allow a subsequent February 2014
suspension,36 GOP leaders strategically deferred the next debt
limit battle until after expected Republican 2014 midterm
victories.37 In spring 2015, the Treasury Secretary was again
repeatedly writing to Congress—with its House and Senate now
infused with additional Tea Party default deniers—pleading for a
raise of the breached debt ceiling even as he began its statutory
enforcement.38
Washington and Lee Law Review).
35. Continuing Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113–46, 127 Stat.
558-71 (2014).
36. Temporary Debt Limit Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 113-83, 128 Stat.
1001-12 (2014). It was not the “clean” bill as was widely reported. See, e.g., Paul
Kane, Robert Costa & Ed O’Keefe, House Approves ‘Clean’ Debt-Ceiling Bill,
Advance
it
to
Senate,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
11,
2014)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/house-gop-leaders-will-bring-cleandebt-ceiling-bill/2014/02/11/1544cf8a-9338-11e3-84e1-27626c5ef5fb_story.html
(last visited June 24, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Section 3 was subtitled “Restoring Congressional Authority Over the National
Debt.” The statute as amended prevented the Treasury from either prepaying
obligations, building a “cash balance above normal operating balances in
anticipation of the expiration of such period,” or both. The amendment thus
envisioned and promoted a future default crisis.
37. See Carl Hulse & Jonathan Martin, Retreat on Debt Fight Seen as
G.O.P. Campaign Salvo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2014, at A15 (discussing the
strategy behind delaying the debt limit battle). Even the strategic move by GOP
leadership was opposed by their Tea Party caucus, with House threats of
rebellion against the Speaker and a Senate filibuster. Only a few rank and file
Republicans voted for the 2014 suspension. See Michael C. Bender & Laura
Litvan, Tea Party Scorns Republicans as House Lifts Debt Ceiling, BLOOMBERG
(Feb.
12,
2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2014-02-11/houserepublicansseek-democratic-help-for-debt-limit.html (last visited June 24, 2015)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Brett LoGiurato, Analyst:
Get Ready for Another Brutal Debt Ceiling Fight After Eric Cantor’s Loss, BUS.
INSIDER (June 11, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/eric-cantor-loss-debtceiling-fight-2014-6 (last visited June 24, 2015) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Ashley Parker & Jonathan Weisman, G.O.P. Senate Leaders
Avert
Debt
Ceiling
Crisis,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
12,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/13/us/politics/senate-debt-ceiling-increase.html
(last visited June 24, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
38. See, e.g., Letter from Jacob Lew, Secretary of the Treasury, to the Hon.
John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House (March 13, 2015), available at
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During the most intense times of default crises, calls for
unilateral Executive action have been frequent.39 In 2011, former
President Bill Clinton said he would have invoked the Fourteenth
Amendment to prevent a default “without hesitation and force
the courts to stop me.”40 Jeffrey Rosen, CEO of the National
Constitution Center, predicted that the Supreme Court would not
likely invalidate such a presidential decision to invoke the Public
Debt Clause.41 Other commentators promoted creative Executive
solutions including minting a trillion dollar platinum coin.42 All of
the plans were publically rejected by the Obama Administration,
however, even as it privately scrambled for options to avoid a
sovereign debt default.43
http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Treasury-Sends-Debt-Limit-Letterto-Congress-031315.aspx.
39. See, e.g., Garrett Epps, The Speech Obama Could Give, THE ATLANTIC
(Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/04/the-speechobama-could-give-the-constitution-forbids-default/237977/ (last visited June 24,
2015) (hypothesizing how President Obama could have dealt with the debt
crisis) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
40. Adam Liptak, The 14th Amendment, the Debt Ceiling and a Way Out,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
24,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/us/politics/25legal.html?_r=0 (last visited
June 24, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). But see
Laurence Tribe, A Ceiling We Can’t Wish Away, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/opinion/08tribe.html (last visited June 24,
2015) (explaining that the 14th Amendment cannot be invoked to solve the debt
crisis) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
41. Jeffrey Rosen, How Would the Supreme Court Rule on Obama Raising
the Debt Ceiling Himself?, THE NEW REPUBLIC (July 29, 2011),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/92884/supreme-court-obama-debtceiling (last visited June 24, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). See also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Obama Should Raise the
Debt
Ceiling
on
His
Own,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
22,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/22/opinion/22posner.html (last visited June 24,
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For more recent
analysis and exhaustive arguments regarding presidential authority to act
unilaterally, see generally Zachary Ostro, In Debt We Trust, 51 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 241 (2014).
42. See Christopher Mathews, Three Not-So-Crazy Ways Out of the Debt
Ceiling Crisis, TIME (Oct. 5, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/10/05/threenot-so-crazy-ways-out-of-the-debt-ceiling-crisis (last visited June 24, 2015)
(suggesting alternative solutions for the debt ceiling crisis) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
43. See Ryan J. Reilly, The Obama Administration Took the Platinum Coin
Option More Seriously Than it Let On, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 3, 2013),
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There is, however, an unexplored, direct solution to deal with
this dangerous, unconstitutional statute: bondholder litigation to
void the debt ceiling.44
II. Preface: Test Case to Void the Debt Limit Statute
Default dramas should be unacceptable as policy; instead,
they have become regular, integral components of the national
governance process and electoral campaigns.45 Even in an age of
asymmetric partisan polarization,46 the specter of congressional
ideologues and their leadership strategizing about how best to
threaten the validity of the nation’s public debt is disturbing.47
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/03/platinum-coinoption_n_4351706.html?1386084682 (last visited June 24, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
44. This author first noodled the idea for such a lawsuit in 2011. See Victor
Williams, Unconstitutional Debt Ceiling: Grandma Bondholder’s Emergency
Lawsuit if Obama Does Not Invoke 14th Amendment, HUFFINGTON POST (July
29, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-williams/unconstitutional-debtcei_b_913309.html (last visited June 24, 2015) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Victor Williams, Preventing Debt Ceiling Catastrophe,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/victorwilliams/prevent-debt-ceiling-cata_b_4054950.html (last visited June 24, 2015)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Victor Williams, Lawsuit
Filed to Void Debt Ceiling: Is Jack Lew a “Default Denier”?, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 27, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-williams/lawsuit-filed-tovoid-deb_b_5393293.html (last visited June 24, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
45. See Peter Weber, The End of the Debt Ceiling Brinkmanship Should
Make
You
Nervous,
THE
WEEK
(Feb.
12,
2014),
http://theweek.com/article/index/256302/the-end-of-debt-ceiling-brinksmanshipshould-make-you-nervous (last visited June 24, 2015) (explaining the
significance of defaults in politics) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
46. See generally THOMAS MANN & NORMAN ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE
THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE
NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012); Matt Grossman & David Hopkins,
Policymaking in Red and Blue: Asymmetric Partisan Politics and American
Governance,
APSA
Annual
Meeting
Paper
2014,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2452554##.
47. See Josh Hazan, Note, Unconstitutional Debt Ceilings, 103 GEO. L.J.
ONLINE 29, 29 (2013) (detailing debt ceiling history and explaining how default
crises have recently developed).
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Can litigation to void the statute accomplish what political
leaders will not? Jacob Lew and the Treasury Department have
repeatedly acknowledged the current harm to bondholders from
the debt limit law.48 Public debt investors hold this nation’s debt
under a constitutional guarantee not only that the debt
instruments will remain valid, but also that the “validity” of those
securities will never be “questioned” by the nation’s government.
The debt ceiling facially, and as applied, violates that
constitutional guarantee, causing Treasury investors not only
both economic and noneconomic injuries, but both current harm
and impending future harm.
This Essay summarily presents Williams v. Lew49 as a test
case to void the debt limit statute. Initiated in early 2014,50 the
individual effort by this bondholder author follows a long
tradition of civil rights/public interest litigation using test case
strategy:
The key to the NAACP’s litigation success was its use of “test
cases” the strategy by which an organization seeks to find or, if
necessary, to create, a legal controversy to establish a point of
law . . . . The test case idea in turn had its roots in activism by
civil rights campaigners and corporations stretching far back
into the nineteenth century . . . . Plessy v. Ferguson was such a
case.51

48. See D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31967, THE DEBT
LIMIT: HISTORY AND RECENT INCREASES 20–25 (2013) (discussing Lew’s views on
the debt limit law’s affect on bondholders).
49. No. 14-00183(RJL), 2015 WL 72968 (D.C.C. Jan. 5, 2015).
50. First Amended Complaint For Declaratory Judgment To Void The Debt
Ceiling, at 22, ¶¶ 41–42, Williams v. Lew, 1:14-cv-00183(RJL) (D.D.C. 2014),
2014 WL 1392940. This litigation is a project of the author’s
DisruptiveJustice.org, which attempts to honor Judge Jerome Frank’s 1940s
vision of the “private attorney general” who sues on behalf of the public on his
own private initiative. Associated Indus. of N.Y. State v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694,
704 (2d Cir. 1943). The “private attorney general” has no accountability to the
government, entrenched special interests, or an electoral constituency. Justice
William O. Douglas, writing for a U.S. Supreme Court majority, affirmed the
role of a “reliable private attorney general to litigate the issues of the public
interest.” Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
51. Susan D. Carle, Race, Class and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP
(1910–1920), 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 100–02 (2002) (citations omitted).
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With extremely limited litigation resources and only a
grudging acceptance of the federal judiciary’s increasingly
restrictive standing jurisprudence,52 Williams v. Lew was
prosecuted with modest expectations. The benefits of a test case
are often indirect and incremental. As evidenced by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples (NAACP)
and the American Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU) early use of test
cases, a first-impression test case may be useful for the
subsequent analysis of the loss. As 1940s ACLU test cases were
then described: “Test cases have also been instituted involving
important new issues which have later been resolved through the
efforts of other organizations or private individuals.”53
The first litigation to challenge the debt limit statute,
Williams v. Lew, is summarized by this Essay to: (1) provide a
procedural or theoretical template for future bondholder
plaintiffs; (2) expose the Justice Department’s (nationally
uniform) defense theory and tactics against such claims as based
on default denial; (3) explain how the Justice Department’s
defense arguments against individual bondholder standing serve
as an invitation for future state-sovereign and institutional
bondholder litigation against the debt ceiling; and (4) frame
domestic litigation against the debt ceiling as an act of economic
patriotism.
The Essay first analyzes the debt limit statute’s
unconstitutionality (Part I), then presents the test case summary
(Part II), and concludes with a plea for state sovereigns and
domestic institutional bondholders to immediately challenge the
debt limit statute (Part III).
A. The Debt Limit Statute’s Patent Unconstitutionality
On its face, and as it is arbitrarily applied, the debt limit
statute violates both the Fourteenth Amendment’s Public Debt
52. See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
“Injuries” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992); see also Clapper v.
Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
53. Comment, Private Attorneys–General: Group Action in the Fight for
Civil Liberties, 58 YALE L.J. 574, 580 (1949) (citations omitted).
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Clause54 and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.55 In
Perry v. United States,56 the Supreme Court ruled that the
original 1787 Constitution prohibits debt “repudiation” when
Congress borrows money on the credit of the United States: “To
say that Congress may withdraw or ignore that pledge is to
assume that the Constitution contemplates a vain promise; a
pledge having no other sanction than the pleasure and
conveniences of the pledgor.”57 Section Four of the Fourteenth
Amendment therefore altered the Constitution to guarantee an
even stronger protection for debt holders and to mandate a broad
application of that debt protection to all government obligations.
Section Four prohibits any law or action that so much as
questions the “integrity of public obligations.”58
1. The History and Text of Section Four
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. See also, e.g., Chad DeVeaux, The Fourth
Zone of Presidential Power: Analyzing the Debt-Ceiling Standoffs Through the
Prism of Youngstown Steel, 47 CONN. L. REV. 395 (2014); Jacob D. Charles, Note,
The Debt Limit and the Constitution: How the Fourteenth Amendment Forbids
Fiscal Obstructionism, 62 DUKE L.J. 1227 (2013); Garret Epps, Our National
Debt ‘Shall Not Be Questioned,’ the Constitution Says, THE ATLANTIC (May 4,
2011),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/05/our-national-debtshall-not-be-questioned-the-constitution-says/238269/ (last visited June 25,
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). But see Anita S.
Krishnakumar, In Defense of the Debt Limit Statute, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 135,
140 (2005).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
56. 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
57. Id. at 351. This case was one of the famed Gold Clause Cases. See
generally Kenneth W. Dam, From the Gold Clauses Cases to the Gold
Commission: A Half Century of American Monetary Law, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 504,
514–18 (1983).
58. Perry, 294 U.S. at 354. The full text of Section Four is instructive:
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties
for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be
questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume
or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims
shall be held illegal and void.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
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The congressional authors of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Public Debt Clause were resolute “to lay down a constitutional
canon for all time in order to protect and maintain the national
honor and to strengthen the national credit.”59 The textual
analysis, drafting history, and functional purpose of Section Four
of the Fourteenth Amendment prove that its scope is broad and
its proscription against the debt limit statute absolute.60
Section Four proponent Senator Benjamin Wade argued that
the Treasury bondholder “will feel safer” when the national debt
is “placed under the guardianship of the Constitution than he
would feel if it were left at loose ends and subject to the varying
majorities which may arise in Congress.”61 Even congressional
critics of the amendment provision, such as Senator Thomas
Hendricks, recognized that the Clause would “change the
Constitution for the benefit of the bond-holders.”62 The authority
of Section Four is best understood in relation with other
amendment
provisions;
the
Civil
War
amendments
fundamentally altered the Republic’s political and economic
order.63 The Public Debt Clause joins other broadly stated
provisions of the Thirteen, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments in abolishing slavery,64 ensuring individual rights
and equal protection of the laws,65 and charging a national
protection of the right to vote.66 Yale University’s Jack Balkin
connects the Public Debt Clause’s history and ratified text to its
59. Phanor J. Eder, A Forgotten Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 19
CORNELL L. Q. 1, 15 (1933).
60. See HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 134 (2003); Jack Balkin, The Legislative History of Section Four of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment,
BALKINIZATION
(June
30,
2011),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/06/legislative-history-of-section-four-of.html
(last visited June 24, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
61. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2769 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Benjamin Wade).
62. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2938, 2940 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Thomas Hendricks).
63. See 2 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATION 230–34
(1998).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
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continued purpose “to prevent future majorities in Congress from
repudiating the federal debt to gain political advantage, to seek
political revenge, or to try to disavow previous financial
obligations because of changed policy priorities.”67 And just as the
Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Section One have been broadly applied
beyond the Civil War context to protect the contemporary liberty
interests and equal protection rights of all Americans, so should
the Public Debt Clause of Section Four of the same Fourteenth
Amendment be broadly applied to protect the contemporary
interests of all Americans regarding government debt
obligations.68
2. Perry v. United States: “Whatever Concerns the Integrity of the
Public Obligations”
The Perry v. United States plurality ruled that the
congressional statute at issue was a direct violation of the Public
Debt Clause. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes’s opinion
emphasized that Congress may not “alter or repudiate the
substance of its own engagements when it has borrowed money
under the authority which the Constitution confers.”69 The high
court explicitly rejected sovereign immunity as a justification for
congressional interference with bondholders’ rights and further
stated that “[h]aving this power to authorize the issue of definite
obligations for the payment of money borrowed, the Congress has
not been vested with authority to alter or destroy those
obligations.”70 The Perry ruling established an expansive scope
for the Public Debt Clause’s proscription; “[n]or can we perceive
67. Balkin, supra note 60. Public Debt Clause proponents recognized that
the Thirteenth Amendment’s elimination of slavery and Section Two of
Fourteenth Amendment’s “counting the whole number of persons in each state”
apportionment method would result in an increase in southern states’
representation in Congress and the electoral college. Id.
68. For an excellent expansion of consistent reading of Fourteenth
Amendment provisions and relevant references to recent lower court cases
noting Perry, see Ostro, supra note 41, at 258–60.
69. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 354 (1935).
70. Id. at 353–54.

RAZE THE DEBT CEILING

115

any reason for not considering the expression ‘the validity of the
public debt’ as embracing whatever concerns the integrity of the
public obligations.”71
The importance and breadth of Perry’s authority has been
analogized to that of Marbury v. Madison.72 Other helpful
commentators apply Perry to explain that Section Four was
drafted, passed, and ratified to “prevent precisely the abuses” of
the debt ceiling’s operations.73 Princeton University’s Sean
Wilentz argues: “As the wording of the amendment evolved
during the Congressional debate, the principle of the debt’s
inviolability became a general proposition, applicable not just to
the Civil War debt but to all future accrued debts of the United
States.”74
3. Abramowicz, Buchanan, and Dorf’s Analyses of Section Four
and the Debt Limit Statute
The debt limit statute’s unconstitutionality was widely
debated by academics during recent years’ political conflicts and
debt crises.75 George Washington University’s Michael
71. Id. at 354.
72. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Recent scholarship has refreshed the known
comparison of Perry and Marbury, noting the foundational nature of their
constitutional jurisprudence and that the two opinions appear to share a
“rights-remedy” gap. See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, The Gold Clause Cases and
Constitutional Necessity, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1243, 1265–68 (2012). Historian Arthur
M. Schlesinger described Perry as a “masterpiece of judicial legerdemain hardly
matched in the annals of the Court since Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v.
Madison.” Id. at 1246 n.11. Although Professor Henry Hart criticized the Perry
remedy as “manifestly useless” for the Perry bondholder, he presciently noted
that the Perry remedy “may not always be useless under different
circumstances.” Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Gold Clause in United States Bond, 48
HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1057–58 n.2 (1935).
73. Sean Wilentz, Obama and the Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2013, at A27.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Secretary Geithner Understands the Constitution:
The Republicans Are Violating the Fourteenth Amendment, BALKANIZATION (July
8,
2011),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/07/secretary-geithnerunderstands.html (last visited June 26, 2015) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Review); Garrett Epps, The Constitution’s Latest Blaze of Notoriety: Bad for
the
Republic,
ATLANTIC
(June
30,
2011),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/06/the-constitutions-latest-
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Abramowicz’s 1997 interpretation, analysis, and practical
application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Public Debt Clause is
foundational to the best of such commentary:76
A debt does not become valid or invalid only at the moment
payment is due. A debt’s validity may be assessed at any time,
and a debt is valid only if the law provides that it will be
honored. Therefore, a requirement that the government not
question a debt’s validity does not kick in only once the time
comes for the government to make a payment on the debt.
Rather, the duty not to question is a continuous one.77

Professor Abramowicz updated and rearticulated this
seminal work in a 2011 working paper that argues Section Four
bars congressional statutes that merely “jeopardize” the validity
of debts.78 An act of government repudiation or a technical default
is not required to trigger protection to public debt holders; the

blaze-of-notoriety-bad-for-the-republic/241308 (last visited June 26, 2015) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Calvin Massey, The Debt and
the Fourteenth Amendment, THE FACULTY LOUNGE (June 20, 2011),
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2011/06/the-debt-limit-and-the-fourteenthamendment.html (last visited June 26, 2015) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Peter M. Shane, What May a President Do if He Cannot Pay
Our
Bills,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(July
20,
2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-m-shane/fourteenth-amendmentdebt_b_903487.html (last visited June 26, 2015) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Michael Stern, Arrest Me. I Question the Validity of the
Public
Debt,
POINT
OF
ORDER
(June
2,
2011),
http://www.pointoforder.com/2011/06/02/arrest-me-i-question-the-validity-of-thepublic-debt/ (last visited June 26, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
76. Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth
Amendment Style, 33 TULSA L.J. 561, 580–89 (1997). This work formed the basis
for Bruce Bartlett’s 2011 commentary and congressional testimony. See Bruce
Bartlett, What Debt Limit? Plan B is the 14th Amendment, THE FISCAL TIMES
(June 11, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2011/06/30/What-DebtLimit-Plan-B-is-the-14th-Amendment (last visited June 26, 2015) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
77. Abramowicz, supra note 76, at 593.
78. Michael Abramowicz, Train Wrecks, Budget Deficits, and the
Entitlements Explosion: Exploring the Implications of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Public Debt Clause 43–45 (George Wash. Univ. Law Sch. Pub.
Law
&
Legal
Theory
Paper
No.
575,
2011),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1874746.
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Constitution is violated “as soon as Congress passes a statute
that will lead to default.”79
The nation’s leading debt-ceiling scholars, Neil Buchanan,
also of George Washington University, and Michael Dorf of
Cornell University, have more recently expanded the
understanding of what constitutes “public debt” to include all
government obligations. They quite persuasively detail how the
statute’s operation traps the Executive in an unconstitutional
“trilemma.”80 The debt ceiling makes the President choose which
of his three fiscal statutory duties he must violate—spending,
taxing, or borrowing. In 2014, Buchanan and Dorf further
explained why operational default is actually “a more dangerous,
less effective, and more unconstitutional method of violating the
debt ceiling.”81 After the debt limit statute was again breached in
March 2015, Professor Buchanan forcefully argued why the debt
ceiling must be eliminated.82
As bondholder litigation is required to eliminate the debt
limit statute, this Essay is thus led back to Abramowicz’s Section
Four application. While acknowledging the judiciary’s restrictive
justiciability standards, Abramowicz confidently asserts “the
Public Debt Clause’s protection of debt-holders provides an
anchor on which jurisdiction rests comfortably.”83 He addresses
79. Id. at 24.
80. See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least
Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt
Ceiling Standoff, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1175 (2012); Neil H. Buchanan & Michael
C. Dorf, Nullifying the Debt Ceiling Threat Once and for All: Why the President
Should Embrace the Least Unconstitutional Option, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR
237, 239–40 (2012); Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Debt Ceiling: When Negotiating over Spending and Tax Laws,
Congress and the President Should Consider the Debt Ceiling A Dead Letter, 113
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 32 (2013).
81. Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Borrowing by Any Other Name:
Why Presidential “Spending Cuts” Would Still Exceed the Debt Ceiling, 114
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 44, 49–50 (2014).
82. See Neil H. Buchanan, The Debt Ceiling Law Is Fatally Flawed and
Cannot
Be
Fixed,
VERDICT
(Mar.
26,
2015),
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/03/26/the-debt-ceiling-law-is-fatally-flawed-andcannot-be-fixed (last visited June 26, 2015) (arguing against the debt ceiling) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
83. Abramowicz, supra note 78, at 46. The working paper was completed
before the Supreme Court’s ruling in Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct.
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“the specific financial injury” suffered by bondholders84 to assert
that Section Four “paves the road to judicial enforcement by
conferring”85 litigation rights:
If a governmental action is found to be a debt questioning
under an objective test, then the action has increased the risk
of default and thus lowered the value of debt, decreasing the
wealth of debt-holders. If a subjective test identifies a debt
questioning, then the public is suspicious of a debt’s validity
and the debt will thus be harder to sell. Either way, a debt
questioning inflicts a financial injury.86

Abramowicz concludes that the courts “have not been given the
opportunity” to enforce the Public Debt Clause, but that a “suit by
bondholders . . . would provide a test case.”87
B. Williams v. Lew as a Test Case to Void the Debt Limit
In February 2014, this author (“Plaintiff”), who holds every
type and duration of public debt sold by TreasuryDirect.gov88 and
also holds additional Treasury debt through vested retirement
accounts, brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to void the

1138 (2013).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 49.
87. Id. at 52.
88. The TreasuryDirect holdings include a Certificate of Indebtedness,
FRN, TIPS, and various duration of bonds, notes, and bills. The TreasuryDirect
holdings create a direct enforceable relationship with the United States and
provide direct evidence of the plaintiff’s ownership of the public debt. The
plaintiff’s direct ownership should be contrasted with those Treasury debt
“holders” who are beneficial owners of Treasuries in the commercial book-entry
system: “The only persons entitled to enforce Treasuries held in the commercial
book-entry system are the depository institutions with securities accounts at a
Federal Reserve Bank to which Treasuries have been credited.” Charles W.
Mooney, Jr., United States Sovereign Debt: A Thoughtful Experiment on Default
and Restructuring, in IS U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT? 169 (Franklin
Allen et al. eds., 2012),
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2500&context=facu
lty_scholarship. See 31 C.F.R. § 363 (2012).
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statute.89 The named defendants were the Treasury Department
and Jacob J. Lew in his official capacity. The action was pled as a
fully justiciable individual rights claim,90 sought only prospective,
specific relief, and was based on the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights and the defendants’ constitutional obligations in the
context of the unique “ongoing relationship between the
parties.”91 The plaintiff pled judicial review of the nonmonetary
action92 against both the Treasury Department and its named
Secretary, pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
which includes a right of review with an explicit waiver of
sovereign immunity.93

89. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2010) (outlining declaratory relief); 28 U.S.C. §
2202 (1948) (delineating injunctive relief). Alternative mandamus relief is also
requested.
90. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 166 (1803). Although
“embarrassing confrontation[s] between coordinate branches of the Federal
Government” provides political context for understanding the individual rights
violation, the claim’s review does not ask a “political question” but rather “falls
within the traditional role accorded courts to interpret the law.” Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1433 (2012); Martin H. Redish,
Judicial Review and the ‘Political Question,’ 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1031
(1985). And the action is ripe for review. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 82 (1978).
91. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 905 (1988).
92. As the non-contractual claim is explicit that it does not seek money
remedy, the plaintiff’s pleadings preemptively reject Court of Claims or Federal
Circuit jurisdiction. Id.; see also Dept. of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255,
261 (1999) (citing Bowen, 487 U.S. at 895); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co.
v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212 (2002) (citing Bowen, 487 U.S. at 899). After a
debt default, any federal court’s subsequent monetary judgment in the plaintiff’s
favor would be a questionable absurdity as the Treasury-administered
Judgment Fund would, like all Treasury accounts, be insolvent.
93. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06 (2011). The rationale for a Larson constitutional
exception to sovereign immunity is also pled as “the conduct against which
specific relief is sought is beyond the officer’s powers and is, therefore, not the
conduct of the sovereign.” Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U.S. 682, 690 (1949); see also 1 CIV. ACTIONS AGAINST THE U.S. § 1:3 (Jon. L.
Craig, ed. 2003) (“The exception to sovereign immunity for actions against
federal officers seeking specific relief from illegal or unconstitutional conduct
recognized in Larson is based on the legal fiction that federal officers who act
unlawfully in the course of their official duties are no longer acting as
representatives of the government.”).
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1. The Plaintiff’s Claims: Facial and As-Applied Violations;
Current and Future Harms; Economic and Noneconomic Injuries
The Debt Limit Statute currently harms both economic and
noneconomic interests of the bondholder. The plaintiff holds
Treasury securities because of their uniquely low-risk profile and
constitutionally secure value. Both the government and the
marketplace have consistently described treasury debt as
“risk-free,” backed by the “full faith and credit” of the nation.94
The statute’s facial violation of the Public Debt Clause causes the
plaintiff current economic injury because the low-risk profile of
his investments are degraded and their value is diminished.95
This incurs a noneconomic injury because this facial violation
causes the plaintiff psychic angst and worry about his
investments’ present validity and integrity.96
These current injuries intensify when the Treasury enforces
the unconstitutional statute with “extraordinary measures” just
before and after an actual hitting of the debt ceiling.97 This as94. See GEITHNER, supra note 6, at 465. Treasury bills are treated as money
and considered to be substitutes to bank deposits by large investors. Although
Treasury debt is held by investors as being free of default risk, inflation risk is
always present, of course.
95. The plaintiff’s pleadings draw explicit parallels between facial
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Public Debt Clause and the facial
violation of other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as determined
in the Brown v. Board cases. See Brown v. Board (I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown
v. Board (II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)
(holding that “the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools”). For
arguments regarding “illegally segregated public schools and illegally-limited
public debt,” see Victor Williams, Applying ‘Brown’ to Void the Debt Ceiling,
ACS
BLOG
(May
23,
2014),
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/applying%E2%80%98brown%E2%80%99-to-void-the-debt-ceiling (last visited July 8,
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
96. See generally Richard Fallon, Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges,
99 CAL. L. REV. 915 (2011).
97. Author asserts that the Treasury Department begins enforcement of
the debt limit statute—even before the ceiling is hit—with its first use of an
“extraordinary measure,” implemented to forestall the statute’s inevitable fulldefault consequences. Lew Provides Details of Emergency Debt Limit Measures,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
13,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/03/13/us/politics/ap-us-treasury-debtlimit.html?_r=0 (last visited June 28, 2015) (on file with the Washington and
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applied violation results in additional current economic harm by
further degradation of the low-risk profile of the investment and
further devaluation of the investment. The plaintiff suffers
current noneconomic injury as his angst continues to worsen
regarding the security, validity, and integrity of the investment.98
As the defendants Treasury and Lew repeatedly
acknowledge, full statutory enforcement will cause a government
default resulting in “catastrophic” harm to bondholders.99
Plaintiff suffers impending future economic harm manifesting as
a substantial devaluation in his investments’ value, freezing of
the liquidity of certain of his Treasury holdings—including his
nonmarketable Certificate of Indebtedness core account—and
devastation of his investments’ low-risk profile. Plaintiff suffers
impending noneconomic injury of substantial worry and angst
over his investments’ security, validity, and integrity.100
The Treasury’s arbitrary enforcement of the statute
separately violates plaintiff’s due process rights. The Treasury
has no legal ability to mitigate harm to the bondholder plaintiff
and without legal authority to prioritize bond payments,
redemptions, and rollovers, the statute’s enforcement is
necessarily arbitrary. Thus, in addition to violating the Public
Debt Clause, both the preliminary statutory enforcement and the
impending full statutory enforcement violate the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.101 The plaintiff also alleged
that the debt limit statute violates the Constitution’s structural
Lee Law Review).
98. These current harms fully satisfy the “concrete” and “particularized”
injury requirements articulated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560 (1992).
99. Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, Treasury Report: The Potential
Macroeconomic
Effect
of
Debt
Ceiling
Brinksmanship
1
(2013),
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/POTENTIAL%20MACROECON
OMIC%20IMPACT%20OF%20DEBT%20CEILING%20BRINKMANSHIP.pdf
(“A default would be unprecedented and has the potential to be
catastrophic . . . there might be a financial crisis and recession that could echo
the events of 2008 or worse.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)
[hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, Brinksmanship].
100. See Amended Complaint, Williams v. Lew, No. 15-5065 (D.C. Cir. May
14, 2015) (arguing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1653, No. 1553801).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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and functional separation of powers in preventing the Executive
from carrying out sworn Article II, § 3 duties to “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.”102

2. GAO’s 2015 Debt Limit Report: A Proxy Amicus Brief to
Support Plaintiff
As noted above, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
issued a Report in July 2015 entitled “Debt Limit: Market
Response to Recent Impasses Underscores Need to Consider
Alternative Approaches.”103 The final Report was based on two
years of empirical research and was subjected to the econometric
review of five independent economists.104 The investigative arm of
Congress documented the direct costs of the default crisis to the
federal government through increased borrowing costs—upwards
of $70 billion. The Report explained in detail how the 2013
default crisis, which caused instability in the Treasury market,
also agitated other financial markets and threatened to do much
worse systemic economic harm.
The Report may also be read as, and was proffered to the
appellate court to be, a proxy amicus brief in support of plaintiff’s
allegations of past and current harms from the debt limit statute.
In proof of plaintiff’s allegations of monetary harm, the GAO
analysis evidenced significant damage to the value of Treasury
securities during the 2013 default crisis. After the defendant
Treasury Department began statutory enforcement of the debt
limit with extraordinary measures and a full default loomed in
fall 2013, the marketplace began a systematic degradation of
short-term Treasury securities. This included “selling them, not
purchasing them, and not using or accepting them as collateral in
financial transactions.”105 The GAO research found that this
degradation involved “hundreds of billions of dollars in Treasury
102.
103.
104.
105.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
GAO Report, supra note 22, at 1.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 12
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bills with payments due in late-October through mid-November
2013.” The fact that the GAO Report repeatedly used the term
“at-risk Treasury securities” to describe the affected investments
is a sad congressional testament that validates plaintiff’s
allegations that the debt limit statute damaged, and continues to
damage, the once risk-free profile of his public debt portfolio.
And in support of plaintiff’s allegations of impending future
harm to his individual holdings, the Report emphasized how
“even a temporary delay in future debt payments” would cause
“significant damage to Treasury securities and other assets.”106
The Report was explicit that such damage “would affect not only
institutions, but also individuals.”107 The damage will be both
direct and indirect as changes in Treasuries’ value and
risk-profile “affect everyone from individuals, whose pension and
money market funds invest in these securities, to global financial
institutions, whose daily transactions in Treasury securities are
vital to the U.S. and global financial markets.” And the Report
predicted future turmoil:
Market participants we spoke with identified money market
mutual funds as among the investors most affected by the debt
limit impasse. All of the money market fund managers that we
spoke with said that they had avoided at-risk Treasury
securities during the 2011 or 2013 debt limit impasses or
108
planned to do so during a future debt limit impasse.

Plaintiff’s allegations of nonmonetary harm (escalating levels
of worry about the security of his Treasury investments) were
corroborated by the GAO’s recorded interviews with a range of
other (admittedly much more substantial) market participants.
These investors expressed their own angst and concern. The
Report details how investors were extremely nervous and how
some had begun spurning the once risk-free Treasuries for fear of
suffering losses or being subjected to delayed or even cancelled
repayment: “Visual inspection of Treasury data and our
interviews with market participants indicated that concern over

106.
107.
108.

Id. at Report’s Cover, “What GAO Found.”
Id.
Id. at 14.
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the potential for market disruption escalated rapidly over the
final days and weeks of the impasse.”109
Providing the invaluable service for which the nonpartisan
agency has been so highly-regarded for decades, GAO researchers
ran econometric models that quantified the “timing, pace, and
severity of the escalation of that concern.”110 As is the GAO’s
custom and practice, illustrative Figures and Tables permeate
the Report. The GAO Report described how investor fear
continues to affect markets:
Several money market fund managers also told us that they
spent a considerable amount of time and resources addressing
client questions and concerns about their Treasury holdings
and contingency plans in the event of a delayed payment. One
fund manager who said they maintained their holdings of atrisk securities during the 2011 and 2013 impasses told us that
they are unlikely to do so in a future impasse in order to
111
address client concerns.

Most relevant to its credibility and relevance as a proxy
amicus brief in Williams v. Lew, the Report contains a statement
of affirmance from Treasury’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Federal Finance who had reviewed it in draft: “Treasury agreed
with the findings in the Report regarding primary and secondary
market functioning during the 2013 debt limit impasse.” The
defendant Treasury Department “stated that the findings
corroborate Treasury’s observations as well as market color and
commentary that Treasury received from market participants.”112
This Treasury statement serves as the most recent example
of the substantial divergence of public positions between the
Justice Department (or at least the trial and appellate litigators
assigned to Williams v. Lew) and its Treasury Department
clients. The statement directly contradicts the Justice
Department’s consistent assertion, described below, that the
109. Id. at 58.
110. Id. (“We identified two measures that proxy for the timing, pace, and
severity of the escalation of that concern: Google Trends data and Bloomberg
News Trends series counts of news articles that contain key phrases. See figure
9 for an illustration of the Treasury yield dynamics and the proxy dynamics.”).
111. Id. at 15.
112. Id. at 51.
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defendant Treasury Department subscribes to the default-denial
delusion that the debt limit statute does not cause Treasury debt
holders both current and impending future harm. The GAO
Report and the Treasury Department’s statement of affirmance of
its findings also contradict the Justice Department litigators’
adoption of most recent GOP and Tea Party congressional
assertions that the harm from a full breach of the debt limit
statute could be mitigated by the proper management of daily
inflows of revenues.
3. The Justice Department’s Default-Denier Defense
The Justice Department (DOJ), representing defendants Lew
and the Treasury, successfully avoided a substantive analysis of
the constitutional claims by lodging a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal
motion on jurisdictional standing.113 In its cramped analysis of
the plaintiff’s first amended complaint, 114 the DOJ ignored all
current harm allegations and argued that a debt default was
highly speculative and based only the hypothetical premise of a
default.115 The DOJ invoked predictable Clapper v. Amnesty
International116 quotations on standing restrictions.117 The
district court, in its dismissal ruling of January 2015, mirrored
the DOJ’s reading of the first amended complaint, erred in
refusing to allow the plaintiff to further amend the complaint,118
113. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss,
Williams v. Lew, No. 1:14-cv-00183-RJL, 2015 WL 72968 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2015).
114. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, Williams v. Lew, 1:14-cv-00183-RJL, 2015 WL 72968 (D.D.C. Jan. 6,
2015).
115. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 113.
116. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
117. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 113.
118. The district court abused its discretion by denying in a docket Minute
Order, without any stated reasons, plaintiff’s early-stage, good-faith motion to
file a second amended complaint. The unopposed motion and proffered
complaint were offered to clarify jurisdictional allegations regarding current
harm. The court then compounded that error by ignoring repeated arguments
about current harm contained in plaintiff’s response to the DOJ’s Rule 12(b)(1)
motion. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“The Court of Appeals
also erred in affirming the District Court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to vacate
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and broadly adopted the DOJ’s default-denial arguments in its
Clapper risk analysis.119
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, the plaintiff sought to correct and clarify his
allegations of jurisdictional standing—pursuant to a 28 U.S.C.
§ 1653 request to amend his complaint on appeal.120
Nevertheless, the DOJ continued to minimize the plaintiff’s
current harm arguments by contending that any averred current
harm was actually based on fear of future default.
The DOJ doubled down on default-denial theory at the D.C.
Circuit. The DOJ promoted the district court’s finding that the
plaintiff’s future harm claims were only hypothetical and
speculative. The DOJ’s pleadings restated and argued from the
district court’s finding of a speculative contingency chain:
Here, there are a series of contingencies that would have to
occur before Plaintiff would suffer any actual harm as a result
of the debt limit statute. First, the debt limit itself must be
reached. However, the debt limit is currently suspended
through March 15, 2015. . . . Second, as Plaintiff’s complaint
acknowledges, even if the debt limit is reached, Treasury has
authority to take certain extraordinary measures to
temporarily preserve lawful borrowing authority without
the judgment in order to allow amendment of the complaint. As appears from
the record, the amendment would have done no more than state an alternative
theory for recovery.”); Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(“After the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, [the plaintiffs]
could amend their complaint only by filing, as they properly did, a 59(e) motion
to alter or amend a judgment combined with a Rule 15(a) motion requesting
leave of court to amend their complaint.”); see also Barkley v. U.S. Marshals
Service ex rel. Hylton, 776 F.3d 25, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a) allows a plaintiff to amend a complaint ‘once as a matter of
course’ within twenty-one days after service of a defendant’s answer or Rule 12
motion. . . . ‘The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.’”).
119. Williams v. Lew, No. 14–00183-RJL, 2015 WL 72968 (D.D.C. Jan. 6,
2015).
120. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larraine, 490 U.S. 826, 831 (1989)
(“But § 1653 speaks of amending ‘allegations of jurisdiction,’ which suggests
that it addresses only incorrect statements about jurisdiction that actually
exists, and not defects in the jurisdictional facts themselves.”); Abigail Alliance
for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 132 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (overturned en banc on unrelated grounds) (granting the plaintiff’s motion
pursuant to § 1653 “to remedy any possible shortcomings in its original
complaint”).

RAZE THE DEBT CEILING

127

exceeding the debt limit. Third, once such measures were
hypothetically to be exhausted, the United States would be in
the position of funding government obligations with the cash it
would have on hand on any given day.121

Obviously, the finding’s first two “speculative contingencies”
had again been realized at the time of the appeal. And, as the
plaintiff detailed in responding pleadings,122 the third stated
contingency was based on distorted language from, and
erroneously cited to, an August 2013 letter from Secretary Lew to
House Speaker Boehner. The DOJ and the district court
misstated and mischaracterized the letter; a qualifying “only”
was omitted from the referenced sentence. The Lew letter
actually stated that: “Treasury would be left to fund the
government with only the cash we have on hand on any given
day.”123 The letter then explained why such a “cash on hand”
government-funding
scenario
was
dangerous
and
“unacceptable.”124
Indeed, as the plaintiff repeatedly pled at the trial level,
defendant Lew had often debunked the “cash on hand” myth,
such as when he testified to the Senate Finance Committee in
October 2013: “Let me remind everyone, principle on the debt is
not something we pay out of our cash flow of revenues. Principle
on the debt is something that is function of the market’s rolling
over.”125

121. See Treasury’s Summary Affirmance Motion, Williams v. Lew, No. 155065 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2015) (restating and citing Williams v. Lew, 2015 WL
72968, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2015)).
122. See Williams’s Response in Opposition to Treasury’s Summary
Affirmance Motion, Williams v. Lew, No. 15-5065 (D.C. Cir. May 11, 2015).
123. Letter from Jacob Lew, Secretary of the Treasury, to Hon. John A.
Boehner, Speaker of the House (Aug. 26, 2013), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/documents/082613%20debt%20limit%20lette
r%20to%20congress.pdf (emphasis added).
124. Id.
125. Transcript: Jack Lew’s Testimony on Debt Ceiling, WASH. POST (Oct. 10,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/running-transcript-jack-lewstestimony-on-debt-ceiling/2013/10/10/3edc0122-31b0-11e3-9c681cf643210300_story.html (last visited July 8, 2015) (emphasis added) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Many of the DOJ’s appellate arguments closely paralleled the
delusional default-denial thesis currently promoted by GOP and
Tea Party congressional ideologues. The Justice Department’s
reliance on the bond prioritization delusion—erroneously
assuming that bond payment prioritization is legal and that daily
cash inflows are adequate to prevent a catastrophic default—is
most problematic.
Separately characterizing the plaintiff’s discrete and
particularized harms as a “generalized grievance,” the DOJ
refused to consider the plaintiff’s appellate assertion that his
particularized injuries are part of a classic “widely-shared”
harm.126 The plaintiff’s pleadings referenced the Supreme Court’s
Massachusetts v. EPA127 ruling that standing to litigate injuries
stemming from harms as widely manifested as global warming
was not defeated merely because greenhouse gas emissions inflict
a widespread harm.128 In its reply, the DOJ correctly argued that
“Massachusetts, as a sovereign State and not an individual, had a
stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests. Williams has no
such quasi-sovereign interests to protect.”129
It is unlikely that the DOJ will address why its defense
arguments are in such direct contradiction to the many public
statements of its clients, Jacob Lew and Treasury Department. In
light of federal courts’ continued mis-reliance on Clapper,130 it
126. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (ruling that even
if the interest claimed by a plaintiff might be more readily addressed by the
political branches, that “does not, by itself, automatically disqualify [it] for
Article III purposes”). As did the district court, the government places a curious
reliance on Reuss v. Balles to support a generalized grievance analysis. 584 F.2d
461, 469–70 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Reuss involved a congressman’s challenge to the
appointment process used to place members on the Federal Reserve’s Open
Market Committee. The congressman-plaintiff failed to offer a causational link
between the appointment process of members to the Committee and plaintiff’s
public debt holdings. Reuss actually serves to emphasize, by contrast, the direct
causational link that exists in Williams v. Lew.
127. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
128. Id. at 517.
129. Treasury’s Reply in Support of Its Motion for Summary Affirmance at
7–8, Williams v. Lew, No. 15-5065 (D.C. Cir. May 21, 2015).
130. Vicki C. Jackson, Standing and the Role of Federal Courts: Triple Error
Decisions in Clapper v. Amnesty International, USA and City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 127 (2014).
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appears even less likely that the plaintiff in Williams v. Lew will
be allowed to stand at bar to substantively challenge the
unconstitutional debt limit statute. Still, there is additional
present value to be realized in the test case.
4. The DOJ’s Arguments Against Individual Bondholder
Standing Makes the Case for Subsequent Litigation by Sovereign
States and Institutional Investors
The DOJ’s generalized grievance argument referencing
Massachusetts v. EPA was all but an invitation to state sovereign
bondholders to sue. Even in this age of increasingly restrictive
standing jurisprudence, state sovereigns have very successfully
defended their Article III standing to protect their independent
proprietary, sovereign, and derivative quasi-sovereign interests.
The unique historical position of states in our federal system
assures state sovereigns unique litigation rights in the federal
courts. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court explained
that states are not “normal litigants” but are rather entitled to
“special solicitude” in Article III standing analyses.131
A state sovereign bondholder’s litigation against the debt
ceiling would have strong and varied standing arguments based
on each of the three recognized type interests—proprietary
interests, sovereign interests, and quasi-sovereign interests.132
During the 2011 default crisis, for example, the rating firm
Moody’s issued analysis warning that a federal credit downgrade
tied to a debt ceiling brinkmanship “would immediately lower
ratings for 7,000 state and local issuances and possibly affect
even some gold plated AAA states.”133 It is telling that the
Treasury’s first “extraordinary measure” in debt limit
131. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518–20 (2007).
132. See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L.
REV. 387 (1995); see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S.
592, 601–02 (1982) (delineating the wide variety of proprietary interests
possessed by States).
133. Tracy Gordon, What the Federal Debt Limit has to do with States (and
Not), TAXVOX (July 22, 2011), http://taxvox.taxpolicycenter.org/2011/07/22/whatthe-federal-debt-limit-has-to-do-with-states-and-not/#sthash.UfwsiWVZ.dpuf
(last visited June 28, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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enforcement is curtailment of special securities to states required
for their compliance with federal tax laws and arbitrage rules.134
As in Bowen v. Massachusetts,135 a state sovereign could aver
both current and certainly impending future harm to seek specific
relief.136
C. A Plea for State Sovereigns and Domestic Institutional
Bondholders to Sue to Void the Debt Ceiling
The debt ceiling’s constitutional violation is patent; “this wolf
comes as a wolf.”137 The Executive, major financial institutions,
state sovereigns, foreign sovereigns, and foreign investors must
all recognize the current harm, and the future harm inherent, in
the debt limit statute’s enforcement.138 Why is the Executive so
reluctant to test a unilateral remedy?139 Why have large
institutional, U.S. domestic, and foreign sovereign bondholders
not yet attempted litigation to void the statute?

134. Kasia Klimasinska & Ian Katz, Treasury to Halt U.S. ‘SLGS’ Securities
as
Debt
Limit
Nears,
BLOOMBERG
(Feb.
4,
2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-04/treasury-to-halt-u-s-slgssecurities-as-debt-limit-nears (last visited June 28, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Letter from Jacob Lew, Secretary of the
Treasury, to the Hon. John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House (March 13, 2015),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Pages/debtlimit.aspx.
135. 487 U.S. 879 (1988).
136. Id. at 905. In Williams v. Lew, the Justice Department has made
numerous picayune attempts to minimize the plaintiff’s individual bondholder
claims by inaccurately asserting that it was citizen-taxpayer action, that the
individual might sell his investments before a default, and that the plaintiff’s
modest number and range of debt holdings limited the chance of a payment or
redemption occurring during a default period. These government arguments
thus also work to support future litigation by both sovereign-state bondholders
and other individual and institutional bondholders who have a long-term history
of holding quite substantial, numerous, complicated, and permanent Treasury
positions.
137. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, Brinksmanship, supra note 99, at 1.
139. See Hendrick Hertzburg, Obama Blinks, NEW YORKER (July 24, 2011),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/hendrik-hertzberg/obama-blinks (last visited
June 28, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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As with Tiberius’s “holding a wolf by the ears,”140 government
officials and major institutional bondholders are perhaps afraid
to let go of the debt-ceiling wolf. Again, U.S. Treasury debt is held
and valued as a risk-free investment. Perhaps sovereign and
institutional holders of Treasury debt are afraid that invoking the
Public Debt Clause to initiate litigation against the debt ceiling
would shock the markets, and that litigation would work to
degrade and devalue their debt investments. What is certain is
that congressional default-deniers exploit both the fear of the
debt-limit wolf and the inverse fear of a released wolf—all while
nurturing their own economic delusions.
The time is now for state sovereigns and large domestic
bondholders, with alternative and layered standing theories, to
initiate litigation across the nation to void the debt ceiling
statute. Such bondholders have the financial resources and
institutional knowledge to initiate litigation with documented
proof of current injury and impending future harm. This plea to
immediately initiate litigation is directed primarily to state
sovereigns, but also to domestic institutional holders of public
debt.
A direct appeal is made to public interest law groups on all
points of the ideological spectrum to support such litigation. The
influential Chamber of Commerce, representing over three
million businesses, has pushed back against those extremist
congressional ideologues who threaten a debt default. Its lobbying
efforts were quite helpful in breaking the 2013 and 2014
stalemates over further suspensions to debt limit law.141 Its elite
140. Tiberius, a Roman emperor from 14 CE to 37 CE, recognizing his
inadequacy as a leader, described that governing Rome was like “holding a wolf
by the ears.” Tiberius, The Roman Empire in the First Century, PBS
http://www.pbs.org/empires/romans/empire/tiberius.html (last visited June 28,
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Thomas Jefferson also
used this phrase referencing slavery. The Wolf by the Ear, THE JEFFERSON
MONTICELLO, http://www.monticello.org/site/jefferson/wolf-ear (last visited July
8, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
141. See Kevin Bogardus, Chamber Prods GOP On Debt Ceiling, THE HILL
(February 10, 2014), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/197950-chamber-prodsgop-on-debt-ceiling (last visited June 28, 2015) (“The chamber’s chief
lobbyist . . . wrote that raising the debt limit would eliminate the threat of
default and allow credit markets to function properly.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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internal law firm, the National Chamber Litigation Center,142 has
successfully initiated nationwide litigation supporting a range of
pro-business causes, and it has achieved particular status and
success at the Supreme Court bar.143 The National Chamber
Litigation Center should join forces with a progressive public
interest law organization, such as the equally influential
Constitutional Accountability Center,144 to support nationwide
adjudication against the unconstitutional debt limit law.145 Even
if actual collaboration is not feasible, the two litigation
powerhouses could work in tandem to void this dangerous
statute. A national litigation effort with review running through
various circuits would set the issue up for final high court
resolution.
State sovereigns and domestic bondholders should sue before
foreign bondholders beat them to some unknown, foreign
courthouse.146 Unlike overly adjudicated Argentinean defaulted
142. John Shiffman, Chamber of Commerce Forms Its Own Elite Law Team,
REUTERS (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/08/us-scotusfirms-chamber-idUSKBN0JM10Q20141208 (last visited June 28, 2015) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
143. Zackary Roth, How the Chamber of Commerce Conquered the Supreme
Court, MSNBC (May 2, 2013), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/how-the-chambercommerce-conquered-the-sup (last visited June 28, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
144. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER, What is
Constitutional Accountability?, http://theusconstitution.org/about/constitutionalaccountability (last visited July 8, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
145. A model example for such collaboration is the Constitutional
Accountability Center’s recent joint venture with the libertarian Cato Institute.
See Adam Serwer, Liberal and Libertarians Join Forces to Defend Gay Marriage
Rights, MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/cato-cac-divided-groups-defendgay-marriage-rights (last updated Apr. 16, 2014) (last visited July 24, 2015)
(discussing the groups’ teaming up to file legal briefs in challenge to the Defense
of Marriage Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also
Jess Bravin, Rethinking Original Intent, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2009),
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB123699111292226669 (last visited June 28,
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
146. It should be noted that state sovereigns as such are not allowed to be
direct holders of Treasury debt through TreasuryDirect, although the
regulations do not appear to restrict foreign sovereigns to be direct holders. See
31 C.F.R. § 363.20(c) (2009) (listing the forms of registration required for
entities).
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debt,147 our Treasury debt does not contain a default clause with
a choice-of-forum provision. Foreign investors and foreign
sovereigns could thus initiate litigation in foreign forums.148
China has reemerged as the largest holder of our debt.149 Even if
state sovereign and domestic institutional litigation is totally
unsuccessful, the adjudication will send a strong signal to
congressional ideologues to end their brinkmanship. Supreme
Court Justice Anthony Kennedy is indeed right when he says:
Any society that relies on nine unelected judges to resolve the
most serious issues of the day is not a functioning democracy. I
just don’t think that a democracy is responsible if it doesn’t
have a political, rational, respectful, decent discourse so it can
solve these problems before they come to the Court.150

Even a failed litigation effort by a wide range of bondholders
would lay a foundation for a full congressional repeal of the
unconstitutional, dangerous statute as proposed by the July 2015
GAO Debt Limit Report.

147. See Lyle Denniston, No Relief for Argentina on Debt, SCOTUSBLOG (June
16, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/no-relief-for-argentina-on-debt/
(last visited June 28, 2015) (addressing the Supreme Court’s decision regarding
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148. See Alison Frankel, If U.S. Defaults, Can Debt Holders Sue for
Payment?,
REUTERS
(Oct.
9,
2013),
http://blogs.reuters.com/alisonfrankel/2013/10/09/if-u-s-defaults-can-debt-holders-sue-for-payment/
(last
visited June 28, 2015) (“[T]here’s nothing to stop foreign citizens—or even
foreign governments—from attempting to use their own court system to redress
the U.S. government’s failure to make good on debt payments.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Washington and Lee Law Review).
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2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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III. Conclusion

Throughout America’s history, buying government bonds
has been a profoundly patriotic act, and the debt was considered
as secure as the Republic’s continued existence. As the first
Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton said in 1790, “The debt
of the United States, foreign and domestic, was the price of
liberty.”151 Our government has used a variety of media
campaigns to promote the patriotic act of bond-buying and to
educate all as to the purpose of public debt.152 Proudly during
peaceful times—and humbly during times of war—individual
citizens, state sovereigns, and domestic institutions have held
U.S. public debt.153
Sovereign states and domestic institutional bondholders hold
public debt knowing that the credit afforded their nation’s
balance sheet allows their nation’s government—especially in
times of severe budget deficits due to contracting private sector
growth—to meet operational needs, provide state assistance, and
honor entitlement debt obligations. Institutional bondholders
hold public debt knowing that their success and future growth
depend on the stability of the macroeconomy. Therefore, for these
and many other reasons, these domestic bondholders should be
charged with the rare responsibility of defending the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of the validity and integrity of public
debt.
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It was with a love of our nation, a concern for its economic
wellbeing, and an anger that congressional brinkmanship
continues to cause unnecessary worry to those Americans
dependent on government benefit payments that this author
initiated the Williams v. Lew test case.154 Now, it is time for a
wide range of state sovereigns and domestic bondholders,
supported by public interest groups like the National Chamber
Litigation Center and the Constitutional Accountability Center,
to litigate to void the debt ceiling. This litigation campaign is a
necessary act of economic patriotism.

154. See generally Victor Williams, Economic Patriotism: Why I Sued Jack
Lew to Void the Debt Limit Statute, JURIST (July 24, 2014),
http://jurist.org/forum/2014/07/victor-williams-lew-debt.php (last visited June
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